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The expanding EU:  
Ever more diversified people become “united ever more closely” 
 
Dr. Wolfgang Zank∗
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper I try to explore whether the EU can go on expanding and thereby 
become culturally ever more diversified, and at the same retain its stability. The 
answer is, in principle, affirmative. Europe has always been much diversified, 
and therefore it is not possible to define a European identity in terms of 
particular cultural traditions. However, in spite of their diversity, the EU-
member countries are united by their adherence to the principles of democracy, 
rule by law and human rights. Countries which do not share this basic consensus 
would not be accepted as members, nor is it likely that they would apply for it. 
An essential part is the willingness of member states to accept a reduction of 
national sovereignty on some important policy fields. The EU project is 
basically about lifting the principles of democracy and rule by law on the 
international level, most and foremost among the member states, but also as to 
the outer world. This endeavour can be seen the core of the European identity. It 
provides mechanisms which allow handling cultural differences, and in 
principle, it is open to other countries. Furthermore, theoretical reasoning and 
empirical evidence has convincingly shown that economic modernisation leads 
to a set of predictable cultural changes, among them exactly the spread of 
democratic ideals. Modernisation is thereby a powerful ally of the European 
project. Further geographical expansion and an intensification of the cooperation 
are the most likely scenarios, and so is the existence of many conflicts. But this 
is simply EU-normality.  
 
                                                          
∗  Wolfgang Zank is Associate Professor at the Center for Comparative Integration Studies (CCIS) and the 
European Research Unit (ERU) at Institute for History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg 
University, Fibigerstrade 2/30, 9220 Aalborg Øst (wzank@ihis.aau.dk). 
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The expanding EU: Ever more diversified people become “united ever more 
closely” 
 
1. An ever more diversified EU and the “Turkish spectre” 
 
After the fifth enlargement, the European Union counts 25 member states with a 
population of 454 million inhabitants. This is more than the USA and Russia 
together. Most likely, Bulgaria and Romania will join in 2007 or 2008, followed 
presumably by Croatia. Turkey (70 million people) has begun membership 
negotiations, 2015 being a likely entry date. Also the remaining West-Balkan 
states have been recognised as candidate countries. It is unlikely that the row 
will stop there. At least, the governments of Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia 
have already declared their wish to join. 
 
Each enlargement has increased the diversity of the Union: Geographically, 
socially, and culturally. It is, of course, a legitimate question to ask whether the 
EU can remain stable under such conditions. In particular Turkey’s future 
membership has been discussed very controversially. Former European top-
politicians such as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing or Helmut Schmidt have objected 
vigorously.1 Giscard formulated the problem as follows: 
 
Progressive enlargement has led to increasing unease. Europeans need to 
strengthen their identity. No “European patriotism” can exist until European 
citizens realise they belong to a single entity … Turkey has developed its own 
history and its own culture, which deserve respect. However, the foundations 
of Europe’s identity, so vital for the cohesion of the EU today, are different. 
Turkey’s accession would change the nature of the European project … 
Morocco would probably be tempted to follow Turkey’s example. This could 
result in a process of permanent enlargement, destabilising the operations of 
the European system and removing its original rationale … If the only 
solution Europe can come up with is allowing entry to the union or 
antagonising its partners, the EU is doomed to slide into a regional version of 
the UN… 
 
From my point of view, Giscard analyses the problems convincingly in many 
respects. Enlargement has produced unease (and will do so in the future); the 
prospect of permanent enlargement is a realistic scenario; Turkey’s accession 
will alter the nature of the European project; and certainly, European patriotism 
cannot develop without the feeling of belonging together. However, his 
conclusion, namely that Turkey ought not to become a member, is not justified. 
Nor will further enlargement make the EU degenerate into a kind of UN. I 
postulate that the EU will go on enlarging and at the same time strengthen its 
                                                          
1  Giscard, 2004; Schmidt, 2004. 
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cohesion. The fields of cooperation will presumably extend, also in a supra-
national form. The cultural differences will not undermine the EU, and the 
feeling of European belongingness will presumably spread. However, also the 
unease among many citizens as regards the EU will presumably remain at a 
significant level. This will create problems for the functioning of the union. But 
it will not dissolve it. It is my aim with this paper to provide substance to these 
postulates. 
 
At the core of the problem lies perhaps the point that Giscard (and many others) 
have an idea of European Identity which I think is inappropriate. Furthermore, 
he (and many others) take a mistaken view on the implications of diverse 
cultural traditions for the political stability of the EU. Certainly, culture is 
important. But it is important to specify which cultural characteristics are 
politically important in our context. Simply pointing at the existence of some 
cultural differences is not enough. We notice en passant, that Giscard does not 
specify which aspects of Turkish culture will make this country an EU-misfit 
also in the future. He underlines, not very convincingly, that for him religion is 
not the issue. Many others, however, have stated that Islam and EU’s normative 
basis are incompatible. Samuel P. Huntington in 1996 even fancied an 
unavoidable Clash of Civilisations, not the least between the West and Islam 
with its “Bloody Borders”2. From this point of view, incorporating a big Muslim 
state into the EU must be like placing dynamite at the foundations of the whole 
structure. In opposition to these views, I will argue that Turkey will become EU 
compatible, her Islamic traditions not being an obstacle. By contrast, the 
predominantly Christian USA are culturally not EU-compatible, at least not for 
quite some time to come. 
 
Giscard did not explain what he actually means by “identity”. But he tried at 
least to specify its “foundations”:3
 
The European Convention [under Giscard as its president, W.Z.] sought a 
clearer definition of the foundations of this identity: the cultural contributions 
of ancient Greece and Rome, Europe’s pervasive religious heritage, the 
creative enthusiasm of the Renaissance, the philosophy of the age of 
Enlightenment and the contributions of rational and scientific thought. Turkey 
shares none of these. 
 
This statement is surprising in many respects. For instance, he seems to be of the 
opinion that there never have been scientists in Turkey, or e.g. engineers in the 
Ottoman Empire. Giscard seems also to be unaware of the fact that in medieval 
times Islamic scholars, who became part of the Ottoman heritage, worked on the 
                                                          
2  Huntington 1996, esp. p 254-259. 
3  Giscard. 
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basis of classic antique philosophy; others contributed significantly to the 
progress of e.g. mathematics. However, the most important point in this context 
is the fact that the European Convention under his presidency exactly did not 
succeed at finding a definition of a cultural European identity. Some Convention 
members, e.g. from the German Christian Democratic Union or from Polish 
parties, various religious groups and even Pope John Paul II lobbied actively for 
an explicit reference to Christianity or God.4 But this proposal could not muster 
a majority. It would indeed have been strange to build a European Constitution 
on Christianity, given the point that such a statement would have symbolically 
excluded the Jews, the millions of Muslims who are already citizens of EU 
member states, or atheists. Besides, the question whether the EU is a Christian 
club has politically been answered negatively a long time ago. Already in 1963, 
when signing an Association Agreement, the EU5-leaders recognised Turkey as 
eligible for membership.6 And in December 1999, at the European Council 
meeting in Helsinki, the heads of states and governments declared solemnly: 
“Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate States.”7 At the Copenhagen summit on 
12/13 December 2002, when finalising the negotiations as regards the eastern 
enlargement, the EU leaders explicitly recalled their decision from Helsinki. The 
European Council strongly welcomed “the important steps taken by Turkey 
towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria” and acknowledged “the determination 
of the new Turkish government to take step on further reforms.” In case Turkey 
fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria by 2004, the EU was set to “open 
accession negotiations without delay”.8 Consequently, when Giscard, Schmidt 
and many others in 2004 voiced principal objections against Turkey’s 
membership, they came many years too late.  
 
Furthermore, in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), 
in 1999 the EU promised candidate status to the West-Balkan countries, among 
them Albania, provided that the conditions were met.9 It follows that the EU, by 
promising or actually giving candidate status to predominantly Muslim 
countries, by implication has rejected the idea of referring to Christianity as a 
defining identity of the Union.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4  Norman, 83, 
5  For the sake of convenience I write consistently EU (and not e.g. EEC, European Economic Community, as 
would be appropriate for 1963. 
6  Gomez, 27. Giscard erroneously states that the declaration in 1963 contained only a promise to Turkey to be 
integrated into the Common Market, something which in his view became fulfilled by the custom union of 
1995. 
7  European Council (1999), paragraph 12. 
8  European Council (2002), paragraph 18 and 19. 
9  Vachudova, 151. 
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2. Culture and Political Identity 
 
From my point of view, it is presumably no coincidence that Giscard talks about 
“foundations of European identity” without being able to specify this “identity”. 
The debate on these matters, also in academia, is often remarkably nebulous.  
 
Let us start with some conceptual clarifications. I define culture in this context, 
in this point exceptionally following Samuel P. Huntington, “as the values, 
attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlying assumptions prevalent among 
people in a society.”10 A subset of culture is collective identities. The most 
relevant in our context are National and European Identity. In this and the 
following section I will try to gain some clarity as regards those concepts. 
 
Also National Identity has often been discussed in an often rather nebulous way. 
As with the term “nation”, a commonly accepted definition does not exist.. I 
propose, in a first step, to distinguish between “national” and “ethnic identity” 
and use the term nation or national identity only in connection with a modern 
state, or to put it slightly differently, with a land which is organised as a political 
community. For the sake of simplicity I restrict the discussion to Europe in the 
first place. We can state that the citizens of a modern European state, or at least 
their vast majority, share a group-feeling. This group feeling becomes usually 
symbolically expressed by items such as the flag or by persons such as the 
monarch or the national football team. In many cases the citizens of a modern 
European state are also united by a national standard language which, apart as a 
means of communication, becomes also a national symbol. The examples of 
Switzerland or Finland show, however, that a common standard language is not 
a necessary condition for this group-feeling. This group-feeling and its symbols 
can be conveniently summarised under the term National Identity. It should 
perhaps be emphasised: According to this definition, national identity covers 
only a group feeling (and the related symbols). This group feeling is not based 
on common values or norms or other cultural features. I will revert to this point 
below. 
 
The reference to a state is important in this context because historically states 
have formed national identities and merged various groups into (new) nations. 
The modern state with its institutions, not the least the education system, has 
created and continuously supported this national group feeling. As the modern 
state, also national identity in this sense is historically a rather recent 
phenomena. 
 
In particular border changes have often produced situation where people can 
identify with a land and have a feeling of belonging to this national group, 
                                                          
10  Huntington 2000, xv. 
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although they are not actually living there (any more). Indigenous minorities 
such as the Danes south of the German-Danish border or Hungarians in 
Romania can serve as examples. Multiple identities are possible, and actually 
frequent. To revert to the case at the German-Danish border, a person can e.g. 
feel as loyal German citizen and nevertheless feel attached to Denmark and e.g. 
speak Danish at home. Historically, however, a mismatch between the actual 
border of a country and the borders of group-feelings has often created severe 
conflicts. During the interwar-period Europe there were dozens of conflicts of 
this kind. They still exist in the Europe of today, but at a much smaller scale. 
Also migration movements have often produced situation where people came to 
live in a country, but identifying with another. I propose to treat these cases as 
modifications of the general definition of national identity as the group feeling 
which has been uniting the citizens of a country with a state.  
 
There are numerous other groups with feelings of belonging (i.e. identity) who 
do not have a country and state on their own. We can point at e.g. Basques in 
Spain or Sorbs, an indigenous  Slavonic minority in Germany. For these cases I 
propose to use the term “ethnic identity”, and not national identity. Multiple 
identities, e.g. feeling as Frisian (an ethnic identity in this definition) and as 
German (national identity) are possible and frequent. Particular ethnic identities 
are usually politically rather unproblematic in contemporary Europe, an 
exception being the Basques (rather: a section of the Basque-speaking 
population in three Spanish provinces). 
 
The matter is a completely different one huge parts of Africa: The African states 
are rather young and were until now not properly able to socialise their citizens 
into national identities. Instead, ethnic identities from pre-colonial times, which 
divide the citizens of the state in question, and which often cross state borders, 
are more important in peoples’ minds. 
 
Returning to Europe: For roughly two hundred years, the idea of a nation has 
been surrounded by powerful mythological constructions. One has been that the 
nation (in particular one’s own) has been “very, very old”, another being that the 
members of the nation have been culturally united by a set of common values, 
beliefs, or orientations. The idea that nations have been culturally homogeneous 
has been widespread. But it is plainly mythological. Rather elementary historical 
knowledge shows that all nations, without exception, have exhibited a huge 
variation of values, norms and orientations.11 This has, of course, led to 
numerous conflicts. But the existence of conflicts is no tragedy. The important 
point is that they ought not to escalate. Nation states have exactly been able to 
develop mechanisms to regulate conflicts in a peaceful way. To these 
mechanisms belong explicit legal norms, independent courts, the monopoly of 
                                                          
11  I have tried to show this in the case of Germany, Zank 1998. 
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force for the state, and, more recently, democratic rules which have provided 
modern states with a hitherto unparallel level of political legitimacy. I shall 
return to this point. 
 
Interestingly, the mythology of the culturally-homogenous nations is also 
widespread in academia. Not seldom is it possible to encounter authors who 
have won high acclaim by works on nationalism where actually essential tenets 
of nationalist mythology become reproduced uncritically. In some cases, even 
crude national stereotypisations can be sold as studies on “national identity”.12 
Small wonder that many people talk and think in terms of national stereotypes 
and generalisations, the “best” one perhaps being: “The Danes are awful 
generalisers.”13
 
I presume that much of the current unease about “European Identity” and the 
cultural diversity within it stems from a mistaken comparison with nation states. 
If someone erroneously is of the opinion that nation states have culturally been 
homogeneous, then the EU might erroneously be seen as something completely 
new because of its diversity. But it is more a question of optics and myths, given 
the simple point that nations never have been culturally homogenous. Once this 
elementary point is understood, the cultural diversity within the EU appears 
much less dramatic. And the basic question is not so much of “how much 
diversity can the EU tolerate”, but rather: “What kind of arrangements must be 
in place so that we can cooperate in spite of diversity.” 
 
A problem which is related to the mythological perceptions of nations is what I 
would call the structuralist fallacy: The uncontrolled assumption that cultural 
patterns always form a coherent and well-connected entity. But at least for 
modern times, this is patently not the case. People might e.g. speak the same 
language and have nevertheless completely divergent values and beliefs. Or 
conversely, people might share the same religious beliefs, e.g. Catholicism, and 
speak completely different languages.  
 
People might even have very similar religious beliefs and nevertheless are on 
practically all other fields culturally very different, culture, to repeat, to be 
understood “as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlying 
assumptions prevalent among people in a society.” For instance, Christianity is a 
case in point. There has never been such a thing as one “Christian culture”, or 
specific “Christian values”. The Bible is an extremely heterogeneous text, 
containing exhortations such as “Love thy enemies!”, or conversely: “Happy 
shall be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rocks” (Psalm 137). 
                                                          
12  Zank 2004. 
13  “Danskerne er slemme til at generalisere”, as said by the Greenlandic member of parliament Ellen 
Christensen in a newspaper interview. 
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Today, most Christians will presumably answer that the New Testament is the 
relevant part of the Bible. But historically Christians have more often than not 
used exactly parts of the Old Testament. And by selecting appropriate parts of 
the Bible and interpreting them, it has been possible to justify whatever kind of 
behaviour. And historically, Christians have displayed all kinds of behaviour. 
Suffice perhaps to mention that Christians have conquered cities and butchered 
all inhabitants (as happened to Jerusalem in 1099), or that Christians have traded 
slaves for many centuries. Also today being a Christian in itself does say 
anything about values and norms and behaviour. For instance, a president can 
pray daily and nevertheless find it legitimate to start an unprovoked war of 
aggression. Giving this diversity, one might speak of “Christian cultures”, 
plural, and pointing at some uniting elements such as a belief in Jesu 
resurrection. But when it comes to values and norms and attitudes and 
behaviour, such an aggregation is meaningless. The same is true about Islam. 
 
Therefore it would have been empty from a content of view, had the Convention 
introduced a reference to god or Christianity in the Preamble. Virtually the only 
effect would have been to exclude Jews and Muslims (and Buddhists and …). 
 
Of course, it is possible to find a rather consistent set of norms and values if we 
refer to particular Christian institutions, for instance the official doctrine of the 
Catholic church. Had the Convention included a passage to “Christianity, as 
interpreted by the leadership of the Catholic church” into the preamble, this 
would have given a clear meaning. However, giving an unelected religious body 
a power of interpretation would have been in striking contrast to elementary 
constitutional principles. It has exactly been secularisation, the separation of 
political decision-making and legislation from religious authorities, which has 
been one of the key characteristics of European history during the last centuries. 
 
Secularisation has intellectually been a produce of Enlightenment. Could one 
identify a European Identity by referring to the ideas of this movement? Giscard, 
above, did so, and Liberals and Social Democrats at the Convention actually 
proposed to insert such a reference into the preamble of the Constitution.14 But 
this proposal could neither muster a majority. This made sense because violent 
reactions against Enlightenment belong to Europe’s cultural heritage as much as 
Enlightenment itself. Europe has always been culturally much diversified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14  Meyer, p. 14f. 
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3. A Definition of European Identity 
 
Of course, something unites the EU. We may look at the Constitutional Treaty 
and find out what actually could be agreed upon.15 We quote the Preamble at 
length: 
 
DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the 
inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, 
equality and the rule of law, 
BELIEVING that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to 
continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, for the good 
of all inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to 
remain a continent open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it 
wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and 
to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world, 
CONVINCED that, while remaining proud of their own national identities 
and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former 
divisions, and united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny, 
CONVINCED that, thus “United in diversity”, Europe offers them the best 
chance of pursuing, with due regard for the rights of each individual and in 
awareness of their responsibilities towards future generations and the Earth, 
the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope, 
DETERMINED to continue the work accomplished within the framework of 
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and the Treaty on the 
European Union, by ensuring the continuity of the Community acquis, … 
 
As we can see, Europe’s “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance” remains 
unspecified, and it is only a source of inspiration. No one becomes excluded. 
And right in the very first sentence reference is made to universal values such as 
democracy, equality and rule by law. This is exactly not a regional, 
geographically-bordered identity, but an open one which in principle allows for 
the permanent enlargement which Giscard dreaded. Explicitly the union is “open 
to culture and learning”, which I interpret as meaning: open to the culture of 
others and learning from others. Of course not unconditionally, the emphasis on 
democracy or rule by law implicitly precludes “learning” from religious 
fundamentalists (see below). But apart from this point, the text carefully, as EU 
                                                          
15  The reader might object that at national referenda in France and the Netherlands a majority rejected the 
Constitutional Treaty, which therefore is something which is not agreed upon. But the member state 
governments, all of them democratically-elected, signed the treaty, so at least at elite-level there is 
agreement. Furthermore, the “non”-voters in France presumably did not reject the Preamble, but rather 
voted “non” because in their view the treaty favoured certain policies which they disliked. Thus 46 per cent 
of the French no-voters declared that the treaty allegedly “aggravates unemployment in France”, making this 
consideration the main reason for the negative decisions (Le Cœur, 2005). But this has nothing to do with 
the principles of the Preamble. 
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declarations in general16, does not contain a border to others. There is no 
cultural “Othering” which previously has been such a frequently-used tool when 
it came to creating e.g. national identities. If there is a hint of the “other” in the 
preamble, it is Europe’s own pre-1945 past (“Europe, reunited17 after bitter 
experiences”). 
 
The universal character of the project is hammered out in the sentence that the 
EU strives for peace and justice “throughout the world.” In this endeavour the 
peoples of Europe are determined to become “united ever more closely” and to 
forge a “common destiny”. However, no cultural homogenisation is intended, on 
the contrary, the catchword is “united in diversity.”  
 
But how can the “peoples of Europe” (plural!) forge a common destiny and 
embark on ambitious endeavours such as striving “for peace, justice and 
solidarity throughout the world” if they are culturally so diverse? After all, 
previously ambitious projects such as the Tower of Babylon had to be 
abandoned as soon as significant cultural differences (mainly linguistic ones) 
had emerged. But the EU is not a Tower-of-Babylon community. Point one, 
foreign-language capacities are so widespread by now that linguistic diversity 
does not impede cooperation any more. Currently, language differences are a 
cost-creating factor (e.g. translation costs inside the EU institutions), and 
sometimes they create misunderstandings, but these are rather low-level 
problems. 
 
Much more important, despite all their cultural differences in numerous spheres, 
the peoples of Europe in their vast majorities have reached a consensus on 
certain procedural questions. These formalities are essential. The first important 
formality is democracy. Not only, but first and foremost, democracy is a 
political system based on a set of certain rules. To these belong the principles of 
freedom of speech and organisation, equal franchise for the adult population and 
regular elections to representative bodies. The majorities in these representative 
bodies are entitled to make the laws. However, the power of the majority is not 
unrestricted, basic rights or human rights protect everyone. Laws which are 
generated through these mechanisms of representative democracy are perceived 
as legitimate. Also executive power becomes invested with legitimacy when it is 
based on a similar mechanism. “Rule by law” is the twin of democracy, 
understood the way that independent courts decide when democratically-
generated laws have been violated, and it is the democratically-invested 
                                                          
16  Wæver, 210. 
17  Here the prefix ”re-” is interesting. Actually, Europe was never united before, so it can become “united”, but 
not “reunited”. Here, for once, an element coming from nationalist mythologies might have entered the text. 
It has been a standard myth in nationalist movements that their aim was to “re-establish” a kind of natural 
order of things. For instance, Italian nationalism labelled itself as “risorgimento”, re-emergence. But prior to 
1861 Italy was never united, the unified Italy was a completely novel construction.  
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executive which enforces the laws. This kind of legitimacy, in Max Weber’s 
words, derives from ‘a positive statute in whose legality one believes’.18 
Historically, there have been many forms of political legitimacy, e.g. based on 
tradition or/and religion. For many centuries, European rulers invoked religious 
legitimacy (“We, by the grace of God, king xy of country z”) and claimed 
obedience by referring to St Paul’s teaching that there is no authority on earth 
which is not invested by God. But modern democracy has broken this nexus 
between legitimacy and religion. God became replaced by the above-mentioned 
rules.  
 
Democratic legitimacy is historically a rather young phenomenon. But on 
numerous occasions it has already proven its ability to generate strong support 
among the population at large, and it could produce much more political and 
social stability than alternative systems. And here we have a cultural feature 
which is common for the peoples of the European Union: All the member states 
are democracies, so this is an essential part of European commonness. We might 
say, of European identity. But this aspect is not something exclusively 
European; Japan or Australian or Indonesia are democracies too. Measured 
along this yardstick, in principle they could become EU members. 
 
However, the European Union is historically something completely unique in as 
such as the principles of rule by law and democratic legitimacy also govern the 
relations among the member states to a substantial extent. On important policy 
fields decision-making and legislation became even transposed to the supra-
national level, making the member-states subordinate to the EU-level. Laws and 
decisions of the EU are mainly done by three bodies, the Council of Ministers, 
the European Parliament and the Commission. All three bodies become invested 
through democratic procedures, either directly (the parliament) or indirectly; the 
Commission gets appointed by democratically-elected governments. Seen from 
this formal point of view – and to repeat, formalisms are essential – there is no 
such thing as a “democratic deficit”. 
 
The body of EU-legislation is very large by now, some 80,000 pages. And as the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has made clear early on, the EU-legislation is 
superior to national legislation; in case of contradiction the national laws have to 
be altered. This is actually formulated rather strongly, namely that every EU-
norm trumps any national norm (i.e. even constitutional law).19 Furthermore, EU 
legislation has “direct effect”, it provides the citizens directly with rights which 
they can invoke at the courts, both against the national administrations 
                                                          
18  “Legitime Geltung kann einer Ordnung von den Handelnden zugeschrieben werden:  a) Kraft Tradition: 
Geltung des immer Gewesenen …  d) kraft positiver Satzung, an deren Legalität geglaubt wird.” Weber, 26. 
19  Haltern, 181. 
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(vertically) and towards other citizens (horizontally).20 Due to these 
characteristics, EU law is completely distinct from International Law and akin to 
the constitution and legislation of a federal state. We recall in this context that 
the ECJ has “constitutionalized” the treaties a long time ago, i.e. given them the 
juridical quality of a constitution. Calling the newest treaty a “Constitutional 
Treaty” or even “Constitution” has therefore been quite a misnomer. It is just 
another treaty in a long row, and when it comes to institutional changes, not the 
most revolutionary one. 
 
Many political scientists have been quite bedevilled by the fact that the ECJ 
could formulate such dramatic principles as “primacy of EU law” or “direct 
effect”. Some talked about a ‘judicial rewriting of the Treaties’ or ‘de facto 
amendment;21 others wondered why member states have tacitly accepted such a 
development. I adhere to a more “legalistic interpretation”: If some basic legal 
principles are incorporated into the treaties, they have a wide range of 
implications because legal systems have to be consistent. The ECJ did not 
“rewrite” the treaties but made their implications overt. The room for discretion 
has been rather limited. Could the ECJ have decided otherwise in principle? Is it 
possible to make a treaty that e.g. establishes the principle of free trade in goods 
and transfers decision-making on this field to a supra-national level, and 
thereafter allow member states to introduce national legislation which impedes 
this free movement? Is the principle of superiority of EU law not an unavoidable 
consequence of the Rome Treaty? Supposed, of course, you really want to make 
this arrangement to work. Denying the principle of superiority of EU-law would 
be tantamount to letting the whole construction unravel, letting it “degenerate 
into a kind of regional UN”, to use Giscard’s expression. But this exactly did not 
happen, and no influential actor has any intention to ever let it happen. 
 
By now the EU possesses a huge body of legislation which formulates a 
consistent set of rules and norms which regulate the behaviour of the citizens in 
a wide range of fields. The term consistency in this context refers to the juridical 
quality, not necessarily to the content. If can e.g. be questioned whether the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its concomitant agrarian protectionism 
is consistent with the aims of EU’s development policy. But juridical, the norms 
which have allowed allotting money to the CAP and to the development policy 
are consistent. 
 
Above we encountered the problem that we cannot recur to e.g. Christianity if 
we want to find a body of consistent norms and values. Nor could we find it in 
                                                          
20  Technically, there is one difference, namely that only regulations have immediately direct effect both 
horizontally and vertically; directives only have vertical effect. However, they provide citizens with 
horizontal effect when they become transposed into national law. And if a country fails to transpose the 
directive into national law, the citizen can go to court in order to demand transposition. 
21  Haltern, 181. 
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the Koran, or whatever traditional cultural heritage. But we can find it now in 
the body of EU law. The EU institutions and the EU legislation is a rather new 
cultural construction. But it is a common European construction, constructed by 
applying rules and principles which are common to all EU member states. 
 
Quantitatively, the bulk of EU legislation regulates economic matters. But this 
should not obscure the fact that the basis of EU law is Human Rights. 
Interestingly, originally the treaties did not mention Human Rights. It was again 
the ECJ to make it overt that all legal acts of the EU have to respect them, given 
the point that the constitutions of the member states have been based on them.22 
Human Rights are something common for EU-Europe, they are part of a 
common cultural identity. However, there were some ambiguities because the 
national constitutions did not define Human Rights in exactly the same way. The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights has removed these ambiguities. Formally, it is 
not yet legally binding given the point that the Constitutional Treaty, which 
contains them, is not yet ratified. But it was unanimously accepted by the 
member states and the European institutions in December 2000. And the 
Commission and the ECJ have declared that they will take it as the basis for 
their future proposals and decisions. Furthermore, the Nice Treaty introduced a 
provision that a member state can be expelled if it does not respect Human 
Rights. Therefore, in a concrete and legally-binding way Human Rights are at 
the core of the European Identity. Conversely, a country can look back to almost 
2000 years of Christianity, or it can be located right in the geographical centre of 
Europe, and still its EU membership could get suspended. What counts is 
whether the country respects Human Rights. Today. 
 
This allows us finally to define European Identity: “The common adherence of 
the peoples of Europe (or at least their vast majority) to the principles of 
democracy, rule by law and Human rights, and the common endeavour to 
establish a set of consistent and explicit norms which cover the whole 
community and regulate a substantial part of human behaviour inside the 
community. Older political units such as nation states voluntarily subordinate 
themselves to the new community.” 
 
The willingness to let national sovereignty to be subordinate to the common 
law, at least in some fields, is an essential part of this European identity. Also 
this is a cultural rather new phenomenon, and it makes the European Union 
unique, until now at least. And exactly this point reveals a basic difference 
between EU-member states and membership-hopefuls on the one side, and the 
USA on the other side: In the US the idea of unrestricted national sovereignty 
and the concomitant refusal to sign binding commitments which might 
compromise it, still commands wide support among the American public at 
                                                          
22  Haltern, 185. 
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large, and it became also a clearly-expressed policy axiom of the Bush 
administration. This feature makes a country such as the US a cultural misfit as 
regards a union such as the EU. The supreme political values of the EU and the 
US pointing in different directions: The EU is about overcoming anarchy in 
international relations; the US (at least the current administration) wants to 
perpetuate anarchy and secure for herself a dominating position within it.  
 
Of course, with a view to the stability of the EU it will only be positive if the 
feeling of belongingness does not only rest on abstract agreements but also finds 
more emotional support. The prospects are not bad in this respect. One 
important point, the construction of common institutions have created a 
commonness of fate and experience. Whether you like them or not, decisions 
taken in Brussels affect your life across the Union. There is also already a 
substantial amount of common European political discussion, political 
controversies have for long trespassed the borders of the national arenas. And 
perhaps most important, in daily life and work the patterns of cooperation and 
division of labour have become Europeanised. This is mainly the case for the 
elite, but increasingly also for non-elite people. And finally, history is in a 
process of revision. At the beginning of the 19th century history started as a 
predominantly national discipline where the (imaginary) roots of the nations 
were “detected” in a very distant past, this way giving food to the above-
mentioned national mythologies. But now new traditions become invented, 
books on European history begin to flood the bookshops. This will strengthen 
the feelings of European belongingness.  
 
Certainly, there have been many historical developments which in former 
centuries have crossed the political borders inside Europe: The coming of 
Christianity, Reformation, Enlightenment, Industrialism, Liberalism, Socialism, 
also Nationalism. This gives a huge reservoir of historical experiences which 
have been common to many people throughout Europe. But it should not make 
us forget the diversity and conflicts. And politically, the detection of common 
European “roots” can serve quite different purposes. Suffice perhaps to mention 
that the recourse to Carolingian “traditions”, so important for the EU in the 
1950s, was actually invented by the Nazis. A division of the Waffen-SS, 
composed of French volunteers, was called Charlemagne. The misuse by the 
Nazis did not make it politically wrong after 1945 to point at the Carolingian 
heritage as something uniting (or to find other uniting experiences). And 
presumably, the common historical experience which was the most important 
one in the EU context, was exactly not something “uniting”, but the Second 
World War. As mentioned above, the Preamble explicitly refers to Europe’s 
“bitter experiences”. 
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But pointing at these common experiences might support a European identity. 
But it does not rest upon it. The foundation of European identity is the common 
acceptance of some abstract principles.    
 
4. Making Diversity Possible 
 
The paradox that the peoples of the EU become culturally ever more diversified, 
and at the same time “ever more united” becomes solved this way: A consensus 
on the basic principles of democracy and rule by law is indeed indispensable for 
the stability of the union. But apart from these comparatively few basic 
principles, the EU-citizens can culturally be as diverse as they please. For 
instance, the EU can be the home for an infinite number of religions and 
confessions, exactly because the legitimacy of its laws and decisions does not 
depend on religion. Provided that the adherents of these religions adhere to the 
democratic consensus as sketched above, there is no problem if people act 
politically out of religious inspirations. Countries such as Italy or Germany have 
been governed by religiously-inspired parties for decades, and currently such a 
party is in charge in e.g. Ankara.  
 
Being a home for a rich variety of cultural and religious currents does not make 
the EU a singular case. Suffice perhaps to look at the USA, a country of 
enormous cultural diversity, which nevertheless is rather stable and successful in 
many respects. Another interesting case is the Indian Republic, ethnically, 
religiously and culturally divided by deep horizontal and vertical cleavages, with 
some 110 spoken languages, 17 of them having official status. There are 
sometimes eruptions of violence, but comparatively, for a developing country, 
the amount of democratic stability is remarkable. Or, following Thomas Meyer: 
Political Identity does not presuppose cultural identity.23  
 
In addition to the general principles of democracy and rule by law, the EU has 
created a huge body of economic legislation. When the Preamble speaks of 
“ensuring the continuity of the Community acquis”, I see this as a common 
pledge to safeguard and perhaps enlarge this legislation. We might call the basic 
principles underlying the economic legislation “regulated competition” and 
“equal opportunities”. This implies not to obstruct the possibilities of others by 
retorting to means such as tariffs, hidden state-subsidies or non-tariff barriers. 
This basically creates a win-win situation. If you cannot protect your producers 
against competition from another EU-member, other government can neither 
obstruct the market access for your producers. According to dominant beliefs 
                                                          
23  Meyer, 52. Basically I share Meyer’s ideas as to this point, but I think his often strict juxtaposition of the 
concepts of political identity and cultural identity is not appropriate. I prefer to see e.g. the basic consensus 
on democratic principles and the we-feeling of a community as cultural variabels too. Seen this way, 
political identity requires some shared cultural identity, but it can otherwise be stable also in the presence of 
a high amount of cultural diversity. 
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(which became dominant because of overwhelming experience), this is 
conducive to economic prosperity. But it is much more, and it is profoundly 
political. A consensus on these principles neutralises a huge source of 
potentially destructive conflicts. History is littered with tariff wars and 
escalations of the kind “if-you-hurt-my-wine-producers-I-will-hurt-your-
coalmines.” Regulated competition increases confidence, stability and 
predictability.  
 
Of course, implementing it in practice is difficult, and the EU has not been 
successful hundred percent. But it has rules and independent arbiters to decide 
controversies, and this prevents the escalation of conflicts because it is neither 
necessary nor advisable to build up retaliatory measures.  And it should perhaps 
be emphasised: A consensus on regulated competition and equal opportunity 
does not imply unrestrained neo-liberalism or demolishing welfare states. As in 
particular the Nordic countries have shown: You can have a very open economy 
and a stable currency and at the same time build up ambitious welfare-state 
arrangements.24 Never before have the Nordic welfare states been so well-
equipped as today, and at the same time exactly these countries are economic 
top-performers. Just to give one example, recently the Economist Intelligence 
Unit compiled a world-wide list of “business environment”. Denmark and 
Finland are on places number one and two.25 Whether ambitious welfare-state 
arrangements are desirable or not remains politically contested, and the 
questions still remains essentially to be decided on the national level. There is no 
EU-wide consensus on this, and apart from very general remarks such as, in the 
Preamble, to strive for prosperity, for the good of all inhabitants, “including the 
weakest and most deprived”, there is no common EU-policy, neither explicit nor 
implicit.  
 
According to dominant belief open markets are beneficial for all in the long run, 
but there have been many losers in the short run: Shipbuilders, coalminers, 
textile workers and many more. Again according to dominant beliefs, it does not 
make sense artificially to prolong the lifetime of uncompetitive industries by 
subsidies or tariffs; it is better to use the money instead for creating new 
employment and retraining laid-off workers. However, in a system such as the 
EU it is even forbidden to give subsidies or to use tariffs in order to protect 
industries. Small wonder that many people who fear for their jobs look with 
unease at the EU system.  I subscribe to the view that it is an illusion to think 
that a government, whether inside or outside the EU, could save uncompetitive 
jobs for a longer time span. But this illusion, at least implicitly, is presumably 
rather widespread, and in the light of this illusion the EU can be seen as job-
killer. This was presumably the main reason behind the French “no” to the 
                                                          
24  I have tried to demonstrate this as regards the case of Denmark, Zank 2002. 
25  The Economist, April 8th 2006, p. 106. 
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Constitutional Treaty.26 And for the same reason, for many years to come the 
EU will be watched with suspicion by large sections of the population.      
 
5. The Prospects of Stability 
 
History is littered with examples of unions which broke apart. Could this happen 
to the EU? I do not think so. My view is grounded, point one, simply on the fact 
that membership in the Union is voluntary. Conditions for membership are clear, 
and if a country cannot subscribe to them, then no one forces it to join. This is a 
substantial difference to e.g. the Soviet Union. Furthermore, if the majority in a 
country changes its mind at want to withdraw from the EU, then the Article I-60 
of the Constitutional Treaty contains a procedure to regulate this eventuality. In 
my view, it will presumably never be applied (see below), its main function is to 
underline the voluntary character of EU membership. The voluntary character 
can be seen as part of the defining cultural identity of the EU. But it is also a 
practical device as regards political stability: New members might disagree on 
many details, but it is unlikely that they are hostile to the bearing principles. In 
this case they would not have joined. 
 
Until now, at least, the problem has been the reverse one: More countries want 
to join than the Union is willing to accept. No member wants to leave, many 
more want to join: Why has the EU been so attractive, for old and new members 
alike? Because the basic principle of the Union, namely the replacement of 
anarchy in international relations by a voluntary, negotiated and democratically-
legitimised legal order has been in the interest of every one. This legal order is a 
“public good” of immense value. Not only is war among the member states 
excluded. It is also excluded that, say, Germany, can use e.g. tariffs against her 
neighbours in order to extort concessions. The EU has become an area of 
unprecedented stability, peace and calculability, and this is a great benefit for 
every one. And no one has the slightest interest in putting the achievements at 
risk. And leaving the Union would make the position of a country very 
precarious in every respect. Some costs would become visible immediately. If 
e.g. Italy would leave the EU and EMU, the insecurity about economic policy 
would almost immediately entail steeply rising interest rates on the financial 
markets, and this would be very expensive, giving the country’s public debt at 
104 percent GDP.  
 
It is therefore not only the cultural consensus on democracy, human rights and 
rule by law which makes the union attractive and provides her with cohesion: 
Also the powerful forces of self-interest in stability, calculability and economic 
benefits work in this direction. 
                                                          
26  See above, footnote 11. 
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Countries which want to join the EU have to fulfil certain conditions. At the 
Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, which opened the way to eastern 
enlargement, they became formulated this way:27  
 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well s the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union. Membership presupposed the candidate’s ability to 
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. The Union’s capacity to absorb new 
members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also 
an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the 
candidate countries. 
 
The last criterion – capacity to absorb – has sometimes been overlooked in the 
academic literature. But currently the concern for the absorption capacity is 
presumably the main factor which explains why the EU-leaders are so reluctant 
to talk about further enlargement; it is also used as argument to delay the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to 2008.28  
 
The criteria are formulated in a rather general way, but they provide orientation. 
And in the course of eastern enlargement the Commission, which was charged 
with the task of monitoring the progress of the candidate countries, formulated a 
huge set of specifications. Seen in the light of the criteria and the close 
monitoring by he Commission prior to any accession, the controversy about 
Turkey’s membership and her alleged “otherness” seems to be vastly 
exaggerated: Either Turkey will fulfil the criteria, or she will not. All member 
states, by then presumably 28, will have to agree, and the European Parliament 
must give its assent. On repeated occasions the Turkish government has declared 
its wholehearted support for the values and principles of the Union, and as the 
EU-leaders have declared, Turkey has made substantial progress. If someone 
like Giscard voices principles objections against Turkish membership, he must 
base his judgement on the following assumptions:   
 
1) “Something” will unavoidably prevent Turkey to become consolidated as 
regards democracy, human rights and the other conditions, and at the 
same time, 
                                                          
27  European Council (1993), paragraph 7.A.iii. 
28  In March 2006 a group of members of the European Parliament adopted a report compiled by Elmar Brok, 
German Christian Democrat according to which the absorption capability under present conditions is 
“insufficient” (Minder and Parker).  
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2) all European heads of state, all national parliaments and the European 
Parliament in say, 2015, would accept Turkey’s accession in spite of 
serious shortcomings as regards the membership criteria. 
 
In fact, I regard both assumptions as untenable. This leaves the simple 
alternative: Either Turkey will fulfil the criteria, or she will not. If the latter is 
the case, she will remain outside. But this is not likely. Most probably, Turkey 
will be ready and the EU will expand once again.  
 
6. Modernisation as a powerful ally of the EU project 
 
There is one strong set of theoretical arguments which gives reason to be 
optimistic as regards Turkey’s (and other countries’) democratic qualities in the 
future: According to modernization theory, democracy and the level of 
economic development are strongly connected. This view gains plausibility by 
the simple fact that most democratic countries are economically highly 
developed. There are also good theoretical reasons to believe that this 
connection is not just a casual correlation. In the words of Ronald Inglehart, 
economic development “tends to transform a society’s social structure, bringing 
urbanization, mass education, occupational specialization, growing 
organizational networks, greater income equality, and a variety of associated 
developments that mobilize mass participation in politics.”29 In particular rising 
specialisation and more education produces a workforce that is independent 
minded. Economic development is also conducive to cultural change which 
stabilize democracy, e.g. by promoting interpersonal trust, tolerance and post-
material values. Seen in this light, economic development leads to a syndrome 
of predictable cultural changes and thereby, as to some key values, to an 
increasing cultural convergence. The convergence happens exactly on those 
variables which are the most relevant ones as regards the stability of the EU.  
 
We can add that this cultural convergence also implies gender roles. Still a few 
decades ago also in Western and Northern Europe most women had to accept 
motherhood and housewife as their main roles, with at best temporary periods 
on the labour market. Powerful political forces such as the Christian Democrats 
tried their best to perpetuate this state of affairs. Nevertheless, the picture has 
changed dramatically. And if these countries have not yet implemented the 
principle of equal opportunities for both sexes completely, they have at least 
progressed a long way. The same tendencies, with a time-lag, can be observed in 
Turkey and even, at a beginner stage, in countries such as Iran and Saudi-
Arabia. This can be seen, on the one hand, as an aspect of ideational 
modernization where the principle of equal rights and equal opportunities 
occupy a central place. But it can also be seen as simply functional: If a society 
                                                          
29  Inglehart, 92. 
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prevents half of its population from entering the labour market, it obstructs 
economic growth. Consequently, if forces such as the Taliban try to petrify 
traditional gender roles, they can be successful for some time, but they cannot 
have a strong economy. But the governments of most Islamic countries want to 
have economic growth, and consequently sooner or later they are forced t follow 
the West also on the field of gender roles. This point is quite important for the 
stability of the EU, given the point that the principle of equal opportunities and 
the abolishing of discrimination mechanism figures prominently on the political 
and juridical agenda of the EU. A member country which would resort to, say 
the politics of the Christian Democrats of the 1950s, would surely burden the 
cohesion of the EU. But again, EU ideas as regards what is desirable and 
economic self-interest (and observable trends) combine nicely. Besides, a 
government which systematically follows a policy of discrimination of women 
on the labour market would not fulfil the membership criteria. 
 
Modernisation theory is not uncontested in academia. I believe it is a rather 
strong theory, if not used schematically, and if seen as describing long-term 
developments. And it seems to fit quite well to Turkey: This country has been 
developing economically, it became more urbanized, more specialized, and 
better educated. And if currently her democratic credentials are still imperfect, 
one can also say, relatively speaking: Turkish democracy is stronger than ever. 
 
Some societies have started modernization much earlier or much faster than 
others. In this context I regard it as an extremely important research topic, 
following Lawrence E. Harrison, to focus “on the role of cultural values and 
attitudes as facilitators of, or obstacles to, progress.”30 It is perfectly possible 
that cultural factors have retarded Turkey’s way to modernity. These cultural 
factors can then contribute to our understanding why Turkey came relatively 
late. But on the other hand it is obvious that no cultural factors can possibly have 
prevented Turkey entering the road to modernity because the country has 
already progressed substantially, and currently the Turkish economy, in contrast 
to many African or Arab countries, develops at a high growth rate. This, to 
repeat, entails further cultural change. 
 
We can refer to representative material in this context. Jürgen Gerhards and 
Michael Hölscher have used the data of the “World Values Survey” to fathom 
cultural differences in the EU, plus Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. We 
concentrate on support for democracy. Measured by acceptance rates to 
questions such as “we should have a democratic political system” or 
“democracy is better than any other form of government”, there is wide 
consensus. Actually Turkey, with rates of 92 and 88 percent, lies very close to 
the average of the old EU-15, and higher than most of the countries of the 2004 
                                                          
30  Harrison, xxi. 
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enlargement. Interestingly, on this measure, support for democracy is weaker in 
the United Kingdom (87 and 78 percent) than in Turkey.31 However, people do 
not always answer consistently, and support for democracy can be controlled by 
an alternative question: Should the military govern?  25 percent of the Turks 
agree, thereby revealing a preference for authoritarian rule. But the Turkish 
value is still below Romania (28 percent) and not too distant from Poland (18 
percent). Again, the United Kingdom scores relatively high, 7 percent.32  
 
Gerhards and Hölscher have also applied multiple regression analysis on these 
data. As it turns out, the degree of modernization33 is a factor which can strongly 
explain the variations in the answers. By contrast, the influence of religion or 
confession is weak and ambivalent. Also the duration of democratic rule does 
not play a role. As hinted at by the remarks about the UK, the idea that support 
for democracy should be particularly strong in countries with long democratic 
traditions, is not supported by the data. 
 
Modernization theory gives reason not only to see with some optimism on 
Turkey’s possibilities to fulfil the EU-membership criteria. A similar logic 
works also in the case of say, Ukraine or Georgia, or other membership-
hopefuls. Morocco included. We can therefore expect that an increasing number 
of EU’s neighbours will reach the level to fulfil the membership criteria. I find it 
likely that they then also would like to become members. I therefore also find it 
likely that in the long run, the EU will go on expanding, and that it will get new 
neighbours. Therefore it also has to formulate new “neighbourhood policies”. In 
this perspective, it does not make sense to speak about a finalité of the process, 
or of the “borders” of the EU. The borders will remain variables. And this is also 
a reason why many citizens will regard the EU with some unease: Most people 
prefer stable frames around them. But the EU will go on changing, spatially and 
institutionally, and therefore it cannot expect ever to become heart-warmingly 
popular everywhere.  But it is likely that it will be seen as something acceptable, 
without any real alternative.  
 
Ernst Haas, some fifty years ago by giving his formal definition of political 
integration, made in fact a remarkable prognosis:34  
 
Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
                                                          
31  Gerhards and Hölscher, 210. 
32  Gerhards and Hölscher, 211. Authoritarian propensities can also be measured by the question: ”We should 
have a strong leader who doesn’t have to care about parliament and elections.” However, I regards this 
formulation as ambiguous. Is this strong leader supposed to be a dictator? Or is it a democratic politicians 
whose support is so strong that he can concentrate on governing, without constantly having to look at 
election dates? Due to these ambiguities, I do not regard this question as properly appropriate.   
33  Measured by the Human Development Index and the level of education. 
34  Haas, 16. 
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political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process 
of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the 
pre-existing ones. 
 
Given the point that co-operation and interaction presumably will increase 
across the national borders, I find it likely that the shifting of loyalty which Haas 
observed will spread to larger sections of the population. I interpret the rather 
articulated elite-population divide as regards European integration, which we 
currently can observe in practically all member states, as a time-lag: First the 
elite changed, the population at large will follow. And as within national 
systems such as the US: There will be many controversies about how to develop 
the community further. But abolishing or leaving the union will not be on the 
agenda. 
 
At the same time, we should not carry the analogy with traditional nation states 
too far. Certainly, in a way the EU can be regarded as a federation. It has 
transferred substantial policy fields to the federal level, there is a decision-
making and legislative system in place, and national administrations and police 
forces are obliged to secure compliance. But the idea of a federation might 
create the impression that the EU is heading towards a kind of equilibrium, with 
a constitution which clearly defines the competencies of the various levels for a 
long time to come, with clear outer borders, and with symmetric rights and 
obligations for every citizen. But it is not likely that the EU will ever reach such 
a state.  
 
Currently, we have a rather “messy” state of affairs, a union in various circles 
and power structures: There is a core of countries which belong both to the 
EMU and to the Schengen space. Some EU members are inside Schengen but 
outside EMU, others are outside both. Three countries are part of the European 
Economic Space but not of the EU. Four countries have entered membership 
negotiations and receive particular aid and support programmes, whereas others 
are subject to the Stability and Accession Programme (for the West Balkans). 
Bosnia is currently a kind of EU protectorate. The European Neighbourhood 
Policy is constructing a set of dialogue mechanism, marked accession and aid 
programmes, and so, in yet another way, does the EU policy towards ACP-
countries in the frame of the Cotonou Agreement. All these aid programmes are 
subject to conditionality and therefore represent a kind of (hopefully beneficial) 
interference. The currencies of the 14 African CFA countries are formally tied to 
the euro. Also the current institutional structure of the EU is “messy”. There 
seems to be agreement on the elite level that it should be altered, and the 
Constitutional Treaty contains a blueprint for change. But even in the case that 
this treaty will be ratified, as a whole or in part, it is not likely that this will be 
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the last alteration. Also the EMU will probably evolve further institutionally. 
For instance, the eurogroup, i.e. the deliberation forum for the EMU minister of 
finances might partly become a decision-making body, for instance as regards 
bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank or the G-8 summits. 
 
Consequently, instead of selecting a fine Thucydides quotation on democracy as 
a motto for the EU in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, Giscard might have better 
chosen Heraclit’s sentence : Panta rhei - Everything is in flux. As said above, 
this is a main source of unease, but it is also the characteristic of a learning 
institution in a changing world. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
As every political community which issues laws and makes binding decisions, 
the EU needs a common cultural identity which unites its citizens and provides 
the system with legitimacy. This cultural identity of the EU consists of 
comparatively few principles, namely democracy, human rights, rule by law and 
the common endeavour to replace anarchy on the international arena by a system 
of explicit and binding rules among nation states. Apart from such a consensus 
on some principles, the EU can be a home for wide-ranging cultural diversity. In 
particular, religious diversity is no problem, provided of course that the religious 
citizens respect the above-mentioned principles. Religious fundamentalism 
which places religious texts (or rather: certain interpretations of religious texts) 
above democracy and human rights is not EU-compatible. But neither in Turkey 
nor in Albania is fundamentalism a major political force. The freedom of wide-
ranging cultural diversity is even a condition for the stability of the EU. 
Attempts at cultural homogenisation would provoke bitter tensions.   
 
Making prognoses is of course problematic. But modernisation theory predicts 
that we can expect a set of predictable cultural changes on some fields when 
societies develop economically. This cultural convergence happens exactly on 
these fields which are essential for the stability of the EU.  
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